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3 The 'Gruing' of Cities

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'Grue' is defined as 'the colour that is green until some unspecified time after which it is blue.' The concept figures in the philosophy of induction, since it exposes a limit to the reliability of expectations based on experience: observations supporting a belief that something is green equally support its being grue.

Thoroughgoing philosophical sceptics aver that for all we can know, everything is like grue, thus casting doubt on the reliability of all our empirical beliefs. Setting aside this radical deployment of the concept, one can sort things according to how grue-like they are. The more uniformly things change and the more their features cohere in law-like and hence predictable ways, the less like grue they are.[1]

Cities, however, are in the grue-like category. This is not to say that unifying models are not available in urban theory. Kevin Lynch identified five: an organism, an economic engine, a communication network, a system of linked decisions, and an arena of conflict.[2] But the point is exactly that there are five of them, each with different and, one might add, notoriously unreliable predictive or policy-supporting powers. The grueness of cities also helps to explain why it is so difficult to find more than vague and incomplete definitions of the term 'city' and why urban planning confronts not just practical and political impediments, but theoretical and ideological ones as well.

To say that cities are grue-like is to say that in addition to being diverse and complex – that is, consisting of many elements located within interacting demographic, economic, cultural, infrastructural, political, juridical, and other domains – they are subject to sometimes rapid change and in directions that defy long-range prediction. Hypotheses that isolate types of events within one of the domains as independent variables

driving changes in the character of the other domains seem always to fail, despite the elegance (or clumsiness) and enthusiasm with which they are propounded. This is part of the idea that the late and greatly missed urban writer and activist Jane Jacobs expressed in her characterization of cities as 'problems in organized complexity.'[3] This feature of cities presents a challenge to any project for introducing environmental sustainability into urban planning and comportment.

The core organizing concept of environmentalism, I take it, is *ecosystematicity*. Both recognition of the nature of challenges to environmental sustainability and strategies to meet these challenges crossed a threshold when environmental concern ceased to be predicated on piecemeal conservationist or protectionist measures. Instead, all aspects of natural and built environments were viewed as integrated parts of an interactive whole, in which the parts have the potential to be either mutually supportive or mutually destructive.[4]

The problem – or, more grandly put, problematic – of urban environmentalism is that programs for enhancing environmental sustainability depend upon holistic, ecosystemic understanding that calls for long-range and widely integrated policies. Cities, if they are indeed grue-like, do not lend themselves to such understanding or policies.

Let me be clear about this claim. It is not that cities cannot or should not prominently figure in environmental perspectives. The 1992 study of the Toronto waterfront, *Regeneration,* was groundbreaking in its approach to the problem of rejuvenating the city's waterfront precisely in situating Toronto within the ecosystem stretching from the Oak Ridges Moraine to Lake Ontario, Niagara to Oshawa, and including both natural and built aspects of this system as well as its sociological, political, cultural, and economic dimensions.[5] The problem with implementing *Regeneration*'s recommendations was and, through subsequent proposals, continues to be that the city does not lend itself to the sort of whole-scale planning called for by an ecosystemic perspective. This problem is, to be sure, exacerbated by messy federal/municipal relations with respect to waterfront authority, the machinations of vested interests, unwieldy bureaucracy, and petty political manoeuvring. But even absent these things, the problem poses a severe challenge to ecosystemically informed, overarching planning. The root reason is that situating the city within a thoroughly integrated long-range plan would require a detailed vision of its nature and shape into an indefinite future.

Well, one might ask, why not formulate such a vision? This is the

orientation sometimes called utopian, though the name is a misnomer. Unlike utopian schemes, which literally exist nowhere, urban utopians at least from the time of Ebenezer Howard and (drawing on the explicit utopian, Charles Fourier) le Corbusier tried and, to a certain extent, succeeded in putting their ideals into practice. Indeed, each integrated a green, if not ecosystemic, element into his vision: Corbusier's (violated) prescription that his phalansteric 'machines for living' be surrounded by ample green space, and, of course, Howard's garden cities.[6]

Time did not treat the visions of Corbusier and Howard well. Marseilles grew to engulf Corbusier's showcase *L'Unité d'Habitation*, and not a few of the housing projects inspired by him ended up as vertical slums. Garden cities turned into suburban developments, usurping farmland and sucking populations out of inner cities. At the same time, utterly unplanned urban growth has led to its own disasters. Left to the mercies of unconstrained development, cities have found themselves denuded of public spaces, urban expressways have displaced pedestrian life and polluted the air, waterways have been paved over, neighbourhoods homogenized or eradicated, and so on, in an all too well known list. Thus the problematic tension between what may be labelled environmental holism and urban incrementalism reduplicates itself with urbanism.

Markets and Democracy

In form (and, as will be seen, also in substance) the urbanism/environmentalism problematic mirrors those in two other realms. In the world viewed economically, the limits of centralized planification are now universally recognized. But at the same time, with the exception of those regions of the world where neo-conservative ideologues hold political sway, the destructiveness of unbridled markets is also generally recognized.

The analogue of free markets and incrementalism in the realm of democratic politics is self-interested voting and interest-group competition of the sort held up by theorists in the traditions of Joseph Schumpeter and the neo-Hobbesist interest group school as the essence of democracy. Against this view stand theorists such as J.S. Mill, John Dewey, and the Civic Republicans (among many others), who view it as crucial for a persisting democracy that citizens and elected leaders temper a propensity to further their individual interests by looking to

the commonweal in supporting and carrying out political policy.[7] This is the analogue of holistic, ecosystemic thinking.

I wish now to suggest that solutions proposed and, to varying extents, implemented in these economic and political realms offer clues to ways of addressing the urban environmental problematic just described.

In economic practices associated with social democracy or Keynesian regulated capitalism, parameters are put in place marking domains insulated from free-market activity or placing constraints on market activities insofar as they impact upon provision of public goods. In addition, of course, to effective enforcement of the resulting regulations, successful pursuit of this strategy depends on flexibility in their deployment, where this means relocating market constraints in accord with changing circumstances and allowing for exceptions when intrusion of market forces into the delivery of public goods demonstrably serves or subverts the latter. Skill is required in these exercises, and those charged with the task must be trusted not to revert to bureaucratic planification or to serve private interests, thus implicating the political problematic.

Unless the practice of democracy is to be no more than self-interested power politics, citizens, elected leaders, and civil servants must all be possessed of a culture of civic virtue. Such motivation is not properly described as altruism; indeed, pure altruism on the part of either voters or elected officials would make democratic politics impossible. Voters would have nothing to vote for (like the three friends ordering lunch at a restaurant, each telling the waiter to bring whatever each of the others orders), and leaders would be pure populists (all things to all people and hence nothing to any of them).

Rather, civic virtue involves including among one's political priorities a commitment to policies that promote or preserve goods for the body politic as a whole – that is, that enable those bound together in the community of fate of common living and working circumstances and subject to the same governing authority to pursue their various life goals without destructive conflict and, as far as possible, in satisfying ways. Civic virtue does not eliminate conflict, not just because it is sometimes (indeed, often) only hypocritically proclaimed, but because there is a lot of room for difference of opinion over what policies are in fact in the public interest. What marks civically virtuous citizens or leaders is that, faced with such difference, they are sincerely prepared to abandon a policy if persuaded that it is out of accord with the demands of the public good.

Boundaries

Referring to the ways that urban architectural designs might address the diversity of spaces in cities, and with reference to social, economic, and cultural divisions within them, Richard Sennett draws a useful distinction between boundaries and walls.[8] Each serves the essential function in a city of demarcating spaces – residential, commercial, industrial, recreational, public and private, and so on – but there is a major difference between their modes of demarcation. Unlike walls, boundaries are permeable and shiftable.

Both walls and boundaries define spaces appropriate for unique uses and, in each case, these uses could change through time. But walls impede felicitous interactions with adjoining spaces. The configuration and precise locations of boundaries allow for experimental change, while walls are either permanent or require whole-scale destruction. In these ways, boundaries are both confining and enabling, while walls are primarily just confining. (No doubt many of us have experienced a micro-example of the distinction when a neighbour erects a solid wall along a shared property line. If fences as boundaries make good neighbours, as walls they make bad neighbourhoods.)

Boundaries are analogous to economic parameters. In terms of the problematic addressed in this chapter, their permeability and shiftability recognize the unpredictably fluctuating nature of urban life and functions, while their definitions of spaces permit environmentally sensitive planning. Depending on how they are implemented and how supple their administration, the Province of Ontario's recent Greenbelt legislation and its Places to Grow regulations to direct urban growth could function as boundaries in the required way.[9] Their success could have the important environmental effects of preserving green spaces and curtailing urban sprawl. The desire of some developers or landowners wishing to make large profits from the sale of land will no doubt be thwarted, and the dream of some for houses on large tracts of land curtailed. Yet city growth within the established boundaries, including negotiated shifts in boundaries where this does not impede the aim of preventing sprawl, need not create insurmountable 'problems of organized complexity.'

The urban environmental possibilities of the Greenbelt and Places to Grow initiatives require relevant agents to harbour appropriate values as well. If municipalities or private owners of currently green land looked only to local and short-term advantage, or if exemptions

became political currency rather than adjustments consonant with the plans' intents, it is doubtful that the plans could realize their potentials. This brings us to the theme of civic virtue.

Civic Virtue

Aside from agreement that civic virtue involves giving precedence to public goods, political philosophers have advanced a variety of candidates for what the core virtues are. Without entering into these debates, let me suggest that, with respect to cities, at least two virtues are crucial: *concern* and *tolerance*. These are derived from consideration of features of the grue-like nature of cities.

One thing that makes cities both vibrant and in flux is their extraordinary demographic diversity: by class, by profession, by ethnicity, and in accord with proclivities across a wide range of styles of life – alternative religious commitments (or secular rejection thereof), sexual orientation, modes of child rearing, cultural tastes, forms of recreation, and so on. Unlike villages, in most if not all daily interactions, urban citizens are anonymous to one another in a way decried by some, who see this as a source of anomie, but celebrated by others, such as Georg Simmel or Walter Benjamin, who saw anonymity as potentially liberating.[10] In such a society, family, friendship ties, or tradition cannot be counted on to ensure that people will look out for one another when needed or that the civilities of daily interaction will be sustained. It is for these reasons that a culture of mutual concern is vital to city life. Similarly, it is because some of the diversities within cities involve beliefs and modes of life not shared across a population, and sometimes incurring mutual disapproval, that a culture of toleration is important.[11]

With respect to urban environmentalism, I now wish to follow the environmental pragmatist Andrew Light by adding a third core urban virtue: *trusteeship*.[12] From at least the writings of environmental pioneers such as Aldo Leopold to the present, and cutting across different environmental philosophies (as, for example, the anthropocentrism/biocentrism divide), there has been near unanimity that environmental sustainability requires people to see themselves in a relation of stewardship to the natural world. A culture including a similar orientation towards the institutions, built structures, and natural prerequisites, enclaves, and settings of cities is likewise to be encouraged. In the next part of the chapter, I shall advance claims about the *nature of*, the *justi-*

fication for, and the *prospects for realizing* a civic culture that includes a stance of trusteeship.

Nature

Civic trusteeship involves taking responsibility for the preservation of public places such as parks (whether directly, as in a neighbourhood park committee, or indirectly, by supporting elected officials for whom this is a priority). It means caring for one's domicile with an eye to the life of future inhabitants. Building projects and architectural design from a standpoint of trusteeship are informed by an understanding of the open-ended and changing futures of cities (their grueness) and hence are undertaken in such a way as to keep future uses and transformations as open as possible. Infrastructural support and future maintenance costs are built into planning and budgeting for development. Civic trusteeship centrally includes an environmental component. If alternative futures for a city are to be protected, then so must its natural environment. Future options are obviously limited by poisoned water or air, by the unavailability of local farm produce or natural places for recreation.

Justification

One candidate to justify promotion of the virtue of urban environmental trusteeship links up with a common argument appealing to Richard Florida's thesis about cities and 'creative classes.'[13] His perspective is often employed to wrest funding from higher levels of government. This is the argument that in order for cities to be globally competitive, they must attract dynamic business leaders and skilled employees, who will gravitate to vital cities. Without entirely dismissing the argument (whatever works), I do not think it a good one to motivate an ethic of trusteeship. Such an ethic, in the first place, should apply to citizens of any city, not just of one that sees itself as a potential 'alpha' global competitor. Further, the argument is better suited to justify short-term mega-projects and to appeal to governments and moneyed elites than to motivate a multitude of ongoing, often local and unpublicized exercises of trusteeship by urban citizens at large.

Turning to more philosophical justifications, perhaps foundational ethical theory will suffice. One might adopt a biocentric ethic and argue that a general moral obligation to the natural world (human and other-

wise) carries with it an obligation to promote urban environmentalism, which, in turn, requires trusteeship. Or, from an anthropocentric orientation, an ethical theory supporting the claim that those in the present generation have moral obligations to future generations (utilitarianism is the most straightforward supporting theory) might be made to work in the same way.[14]

While I wish urban philosophers well in taking such tacks, the approach to justification of urban trusteeship suggested here is of a somewhat different order – not exactly ethically foundationist and, though anthropocentric, not, I think, in a way that sets its prescriptions against those of biocentrism, at least as far as promoting urban environmental sustainability goes.[15] It hearkens to the grandfather of virtue theory, Aristotle. For him, the virtues were habits, action in accord with which was requisite for 'happiness.' Happiness, for Aristotle, was definitive of a meaningful life. Such a life involves people developing their proper potentials to the fullest. Since some potentials – such as to inflict pain on others or to ravage the earth – ought not to be encouraged, a way to identify worthwhile life activities is needed. Aristotle himself expanded on the list of virtues embedded in the conventions of his time – courage, prudence, temperance, justice – for this purpose.

Most, if not all, subsequent philosophers have (like Aristotle) been loath to rely on tradition (or on it alone) to identify appropriate virtues, and they adopt a variety of strategies to find an alternative. The theorist I shall draw on is C.B. Macpherson. He offered an open-ended list of 'truly human powers' – the capacities for aesthetic creation, contemplation, friendship and love, religious experience, moral judgment and action, rational understanding – identified by reference neither to tradition nor to a foundational ethical theory, but to the formal property that successful realization of the potentials by some people need not be at the expense of their realization by others. One is not in a zero-sum game with respect to the development of human potentials.[16]

Or rather, one *need* not be in this game. Acquiring knowledge requires education, and nurturing friendship requires free time. In a world of limited and unevenly distributed resources, it may happen that for some to receive adequate education or free time requires others to pay taxes for public education, which they balk at doing, or, again reluctantly, provide employees with sufficient salaries so that they need not work more than one job or so they receive paid time off. Macpherson's claim is that these conflicts are not inherent to the potentials themselves, but derive from constraints subject to removal by appropriate social

and economic policies. The virtue of concern referred to earlier enters as one motive for removal of the constraints, provided that substantial numbers of citizens – and, hence, the public policies they support – are motivated by concern for adequate resource distribution.

The goal projected by Macpherson (no doubt a goal the full realization of which could be approached only asymptotically) is a world where everyone can lead a meaningful life in something like an Aristotelian sense. Theorists of ethics disagree about whether or how the moral desirability of such a world requires justification. For the purpose of addressing the urban environmental problematic, I do not think one needs to enter these debates. It suffices to show, rather, that in such a world – for whatever reasons it is ultimately valued – progress towards environmental sustainability, which recognizes the unique nature of cities, would be facilitated.

To demand approaching urban projects and problems in an attitude of trusteeship is not to enjoin collective subscription to one particular urban (or, indeed, natural-environmental) vision. Rather, individuals with different visions or with aims that fall short of grand visions are asked to pursue these things with an eye to maintaining options for future urban citizens.

Being diverse, there is no guarantee that the visions and aims will always converge on common actions, but when they do not, issues of collective problem solving will be posed. If such exercises are themselves guided by the virtue of trusteeship, along with concern and tolerance, they will at least have these shared values as benchmarks in negotiating differences. If, in addition, each understands the importance of border creation instead of wall construction, this should also allow for the preservation of both present and future diversity by not creating built forms, infrastructures, civic plans, and institutions that are difficult to adjust or dismantle.

As for environmental preservation, it should be obvious that exercise of the all too often exhibited human potential for environmental destruction fails Macpherson's test for being a 'truly human' component of a meaningful life. Humans are, after all, themselves animals. As such, humans are continuous with and dependent on their natural environment. Destructive behaviour towards nature on the part of some people can only put severe constraints (in the limiting case, death) on the ability of other people to develop their own potentials.

This observation does not by itself suggest how to address situations when available resources (both natural and created and equitably dis-

tributed or not) are insufficient to provide everyone with the means of developing their proper potentials, given overall consumption demands. One of Macpherson's reactions is to claim that the resulting shortfall of resources is artificial. It derives from what he saw as a consumerist thirst for consumption far beyond what is required for a meaningful life as viewed by Aristotle, who referred to the drive in question as the pathological state of *pleonexia*.[17] Contrary to depictions of what he labelled 'possessive individualism' as an ineradicable feature of human nature, Macpherson argued that a thirst for indefinite private consumption was an effect, rather than a cause, of life in a competitive market society.

The nub of the pleonexic problem for Macpherson is that people regard their own and other people's powers as private property. In fact, the powers are mainly some combination of genetic inheritance and the products of socialization and education, themselves the issues of historically accumulated knowledge, habits, and institutions. The alternative to 'self-ownership' with respect to people's talents is that people are their trustees. If I am the trustee of my powers, with obligations to employ them in a way that is beneficial to others (as to myself), it follows that I am also the trustee of those resources required for the development and deployment of these powers. To the extent that these resources include elements of my natural environment – as surely they do – I am also their trustee.

Realism

The examples of planning and design in terms of boundaries instead of walls illustrates that this orientation is realistic. Many political leaders, urban planners, and urban architects, as well as ordinary citizens and some entrepreneurs, already adopt this orientation. The realism of urban dwellers adopting trusteeship roles needs more defence. Notwithstanding the misgivings expressed earlier about utopian urban planning, it must be allowed that a certain measure of visionary, if not exactly utopian, entreaty is unavoidable in thinking about urban environmentalism. The alternative is either foolish complacency or debilitating despair. Still, if no discernible paths towards realization of the goal in question – a general culture of trusteeship – could be identified, then, according to the arguments of this chapter, prospects for urban environmentalism would indeed be bleak.

Recent surveys of some U.S. cities report two sets of pertinent find-

ings. One is that public support for sustainable urban planning is the strongest in cities with relative lack of industry and with populations of older people.[18] Another finding is that, from a menu of potential outcomes of urban planning, citizens consistently place 'livability of the built environment' as their top priority.[19] The authors of the latter report, Philip Berke and Maria Conroy, find it distressing that the livability priority tops 'harmony with nature,' 'freedom from pollution,' and other directly environmentalist values, just as Kent Portney, the author of the other report, sees it as challenging that cities with industry and younger populations are not equally supportive of urban sustainability. No doubt these are causes for concern, but, at the same time, the reported findings hold out hope for the possibility of a culture of urban environmental trusteeship.

If some people, older or otherwise, can support environmentally sustainable urban planning (a presumption of the first-mentioned report), then a stance of environmental stewardship cannot be inimical to human nature per se. It might be pointed out as well that a value of trusteeship is not entirely foreign to other than older people. Parents exhibit this value when they make sacrifices in the interests of the future lives of their children. That the presence of industry in a city inhibits environmental planning suggests that people confront a trade-off between economic and environmental concerns. But the problem admits of possible, if demanding, confrontation, for example, in the way that some European countries have combined technological innovation and regulation to promote green development. It is not difficult to demonstrate that livability requires environmental sustainability. If people highly value the former, it becomes a matter of education to link the two – again, a challenging but not impossible task.

The observation about industrial cities harks back to the earlier discussion of economics and politics, now considered substantively. Scott Campbell situates the problematic here being addressed in what he calls the 'planning triangle' of environmental protection, economic development, and social equity. Echoing the views of many pessimists, he describes how these three goals can work against each other, but unlike the pessimists, he also sees ways that they can be mutually supportive.[20]

He thus depicts a spiral situation. We have too many examples of political/economic/environmental spirals moving in downward directions. If there is the possibility of economic development, equitable and democratic city planning, and environmental sustainability mutually

supporting one another, there is no reason, in principle, that they could not spiral upward instead. Attitudes of urban-environmental trusteeship are required, but also nourished and strengthened, in such a process.

Finally, one element of the grue-like nature of cities related to the virtue of concern suggests another ground for optimism, namely, the anonymity of cities. In one way, the anonymity of city life makes people's thinking of themselves as trustees for those things that enhance city life more tenuous than when they are acting for people known to them, such as their children. But at the same time, once inculcated, a trusteeship stance is richer, precisely because of urban anonymity. As the future of a city held in trust becomes more distant from the present, it is increasingly anonymously populated. Of the two components of the beneficiaries of a culture of urban-environmental trusteeship – that they exist in the future, and that they are anonymous to the trustee – the latter is already present in the case of cities.

Agency

This chapter has inquired after conditions conducive to the promotion of urban environmentalism in the face of differences between the natural and the urban-built environments: that is, between ecosystematicity and grueness. The central hypothesis of the chapter is that a combination of urban development that shuns walls in favour of borders and that includes a civic culture of trusteeship is suited to this task.

A dimension of the question not so far addressed is that of agency. *Who* is to promote the recommended virtues and border-sensitive orientation? Researchers, elected officials, civil servants, community pillars, and media folk are all potential educators, as, of course, are teachers or apprentice teachers. Urban planners, political leaders, and urban architects can teach by example. The planner, councillor, or mayor who acts only to aggrandize a local constituency (or him- or herself) and who erects divisive and inflexible walls sets a bad example, as does the developer who looks only to profit or the architect who acts as a hired gun for a client, no matter how irresponsible the latter's charge, or just to gain notoriety by creating startling edifices.

Contrary comportment for all these categories of urban citizens is not hard to describe. The more practitioners and educators there are exhibiting such comportment, the more hopeful the prospect that urban grue will be green.

NOTES

1 The reason that these features are evidence against grueness is that they substantiate a hypothesis that something is structured in a way that militates against the sort of sudden and dramatic change that marks grue-like entities. Such a hypothesis is strengthened if it is derived from a coherent and independently empirically supported theory about the structure in question. (The thoroughgoing sceptical position set aside in the chapter sees a regress problem, since putatively empirical support would also confront gruish logical possibilities.)
2 Kevin Lynch, *A Theory of Good City Form* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 328–42.
3 Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1961), 433.
4 The notion of ecosystematicity is the starting place of all streams of post-conservationist approaches to environmentalism, whether of the 'deep' and biocentric approach or the 'social-ecological' anthropocentric one. An originating publication of the former approach is Arne Naess's 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecological Movement,' *Inquiry* 16 (Spring 1973): 95–100, and of the latter approach, Murray Bookchin's *Our Synthetic Environment* (New York: Colphon, 1974).
5 David Crombie et al., *Regeneration: Toronto's Waterfront and the Sustainable City*, Report on the Royal Commission of the Future of the Toronto Waterfront (Queen's Printer of Ontario, 1992).
6 Ebenezer Howard, *Garden Cities of Tomorrow* [1902] (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965); Le Corbusier, *The City of Tomorrow and Its Planning* [1929] (London: Architectural Press, 1971). Howard's *Garden Cities of Tomorrow* is also treated in Stephen Bede Scharper's chapter in part II of this volume.
7 I survey these and other approaches to democracy in my *Democratic Theory: A Critical Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2002).
8 Richard Sennett, *The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities* (New York: Norton, 1990), 190ff.
9 The Greenbelt legislation protects some lands around urban areas from development. The Places to Grow legislation prohibits municipalities from expanding into new suburbs unless they have achieved specified living/working densities within their existing borders. To access the legislation, use www.gov.on.ca, then search for Greenbelt Act 2005 and scroll to the act; see also www.placestogrow.ca.
10 See Georg Simmel's 'The Metropolis and Mental Life,' written in 1903, reproduced in *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, ed. Kurt Wolff (New York:

Free Press, 1964), 409–24. The theme of anonymity (that which makes cities safe for the *flâneur*) is a central one in Walter Benjamin's *Pariser Passagen*, written between 1928 and 1930, in English translation as *The Arcades Project* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

11 I develop this topic in 'Cities: A Philosophical Inquiry,' Centre for Urban and Community Studies Research Bulletin 39, University of Toronto, September 2007. This Centre was the forerunner of the University's Cities Centre. The paper is available at: http://individual.ca/frankcunningham.

12 Andrew Light sees stewardship as the central value required for 'ecological citizenship' in cities. 'Urban Ecological Citizenship,' *Journal of Social Philosophy* 34, 2 (Spring 2002): 44–63, at 58.

13 Richard L. Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class* (New York: Basic Books, 2002). The notion of the 'global city' is also critically examined by Hilary Cunningham in part III of this volume.

14 Dale Jamieson examines several arguments to justify stewardship, specifically regarding the preservation of urban landmarks. Finding flaws especially in those that appeal to obligations to future (or past) generations, he settles on the argument that landmarks embody 'common wisdom' and are therefore more likely to provide present and future generations with the conditions for a 'higher quality of life than anything we may produce.' *Morality's Progress* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 276.

15 The criterion of compossible potential development appealed to below could be fully compatible with biocentrism only if the potentials of all living things were included, as, perhaps, the teleological biocentrist Paul Taylor would have it. *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). Otherwise, deployment of the criterion with respect to urban environmentalism would be mute on such topics as vegetarianism or animal experimentation and hence in potential conflict with biocentrism.

16 C.B. Macpherson, *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 4.

17 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 5: 1130a. See Bernard Hodgson's deployment of this concept in 'On Economic Men Bearing Gifts and Playing Fair,' in *The Invisible Hand and the Common Good*, ed. Hodgson (Berlin: Springer, 2004), 279–98.

18 Kent E. Portney, 'Taking Sustainable Cities Seriously: A Comparative Analysis of Twenty-four US Cities,' *Local Environment* 7, 4 (2002): 363–80.

19 Philip R. Berke and Maria Manta Conroy, 'Are We Planning for Sustainable Development? An Evaluation of 30 Comprehensive Plans,' *American Planning Journal* 66, 1 (Winter 2000): 21–33.

20 Scott Campbell, 'Planning: Green Cities, Growing Cities, Just Cities? Urban Planning and the Contradictions of Sustainable Development,' in *The Earthscan Reader in Sustainable Cities*, ed. David Sitterhwaite (London: Earthscan Publications, 1999), 251–73. An example of a pessimist on this matter is Kai Lee, who sees little hope for urban sustainability either in the poor cities, in virtue of their very poverty, or in rich cities, due to the extravagant consumerism of their inhabitants. 'Urban Sustainability and the Limits of Classical Environmentalism,' *Environment and Urbanization* 18, 1 (2006): 9–22.